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INTRODUCTION
The mail fraud statue, once described as the federal prosecutor’s
“Colt 45 [or] Louisville Slugger”1 is one of the federal government’s
major weapons in the fight against political corruption.2 The statute
proscribes using the mails to carry out “any scheme or artifice to
defraud.”3 When first enacted, the mail fraud statute was limited to
traditional frauds involving money or property.4 At the turn of the
twentieth century, however, the United States Supreme Court
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771,
771 (1980).
2
See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1998); Joshua A. Kobrin, Note, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of
Trust and Betrayal Applied to the Mail Fraud Statute and §§ 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 779, 792 (2006); Carrie A. Tendler, Note, An Indictment of Bright
Line Tests for Honest Services Mail Fraud, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2729 (2004).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
4
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
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concluded that certain fraud statutes were not limited to the loss of
money or property. In Hammerschmidt v. United States, the Court
concluded that the government was defrauded when someone
interferes with its “lawful governmental functions by deceit, craft or
trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.”5 Hammerschmidt and
its progeny led to the creation of the “intangible rights theory” through
which the mail fraud statute was used to reach non-pecuniary frauds.6
In the mid twentieth century prosecutors developed the “honest
services” theory.7 Under this theory, public officials owe fiduciary
duties to the citizenry.8 One of their fiduciary duties is to provide the
public their “honest services.”9 In the battle against public corruption,
prosecutors charged public officials with mail fraud when they utilized
the mails in connection with breaching their fiduciary duties.10 Typical
breaches of fiduciary duty involved the acceptance of bribes or the
participation in kickback schemes.11 Until the 1970s, the honest
services theory was used in connection with pecuniary frauds.12 But
after Watergate, when federal prosecutors were specifically charged
with fighting public corruption at the state and local levels, innovative
prosecutors combined the intangible rights theory with the honest
services theory and created the honest services fraud doctrine.13 Under
this doctrine public officials could be indicted for mail fraud when
5

265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790 n.50 (2006).
7
See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); Kobrin, supra
note 2, at 791.
8
McNally, 483 U.S. at 355.
9
See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); Shushan,
117 F.2d at 115 (“[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a public official”).
10
See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124.
11
See United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United
States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998).
12
Kobrin, supra note 2, at 791.
13
Moohr, supra note 2, at 2-8; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790-94; Tendler, supra
note 2, at 2730-34.
6
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they breached their fiduciary duties regardless of whether or not the
public suffered a tangible loss.14 Although the honest services fraud
doctrine began in the public sector it was later extended to the private
sector.15
Over the next two decades each Circuit accepted the honest
services fraud doctrine.16 But in 1987, the Supreme Court struck the
doctrine down in McNally v. United States, holding that the mail fraud
statute was limited to frauds involving money or property.17 One year
later, Congress resurrected the honest services fraud doctrine through
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346.18 Section 1346 states that “[f]or
the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services.”19 Congress, however, failed to define the terms
“intangible rights” and “honest services.” As a result the statute is
frequently challenged on vagueness and federalism grounds.20 To
counter these concerns, the lower courts have adopted various limiting
principles to help limit prosecutorial overreach and to prevent minor

14

See, e.g., Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347; Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124.
See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981). Two articles
discussing honest services fraud in the private sector include John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 427 (1998) and Tendler, supra note 2. Honest services fraud in the
private sector is beyond the scope of this Note.
16
United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Sara Sun
Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute
Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions
and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 699, 711 (2000); Kobrin, supra note 2, at 794.
17
483 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1987).
18
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
19
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
20
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Waymer 55 F.3d 564 (11th Cir. 1995).
15
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breaches of fiduciary duties from becoming federal crimes. 21 In
United States v. Bloom the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit established its limiting principle as the “misuse of
office . . . for private gain.”22 The Seventh Circuit is the only Circuit
that has adopted this standard.23
Recently, the Seventh Circuit refined its Bloom standard in United
States v. Thompson.24 In Thompson, Georgia Thompson, a state civil
servant steered a contract to a business whose owner gave political
donations to the Wisconsin Governor’s reelection campaign, both prior
to and after the award of the contract.25 The political contributions,
however, were fully disclosed and there was no evidence that
Thompson or anyone else accepted a bribe or was involved in a
kickback scheme.26 Although the Seventh Circuit has long held that
“[n]ot every breach of every fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud,”27
in Thompson the government’s theory was that “any politically
motivated departure from state administrative rules is a federal crime,
21

See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104-07 (10th Cir. 2003)
(requiring that the government prove an intent to defraud); United States v.
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002) (adopting a state law limiting
principle); United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998) (adopting the
misuse of office for private gain limiting principle); United States v. Brumley, 116
F.3d 728, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (requiring that the government prove that
services owed under state law were not delivered); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d
713, 732 (1st Cir. 1996) (requiring that the government prove “a demonstrated intent
to deceive”).
22
Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655.
23
United States v. Malone, No. 02:03-CR-00500-LRH-LRL, 2006 WL
2583293, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2006); Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud &
RICO Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 113, 115
(2006).
24
484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007).
25
Id. at 878-79.
26
Id. at 879, 881. Thompson was also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 666
entitled “Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds,” but she was
not charged with bribery. Id. at 880-81. Rather the government’s theory was that she
“misapplied” federal funds. Id.
27
Bloom, 149 F.3d at 645 (citing United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512
(7th Cir. 1973).
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when the mails . . . are involved.”28 The government further argued
that Thompson “deprived Wisconsin of her ‘honest services’ [when
she failed] to implement state law the way the administrative code laid
it down.”29
In deciding Thompson the Seventh Circuit rejected the
government’s theory that all politically motivated violations of
administrative rules are federal crimes.30 The court stated “[t]he idea
that it is a federal crime for any official in state or local government to
take account of political considerations when deciding how to spend
public money is preposterous.”31 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
Ms. Thompson was innocent, reversed her conviction, and ordered her
immediate release from prison—even prior to issuing its formal
opinion.32
Although the Thompson facts were exceptional,33 from a legal
perspective the case appears to be rather ordinary. In deciding the case,
the Seventh Circuit applied and followed the limiting principle it
announced in Bloom.34 The court found that Thompson neither

28

Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878.
Id. at 882.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 883.
32
Id. at 878.
33
Wisconsin Governor, and former state attorney general, Jim Doyle was
quoted as saying “the three judges did an ‘extraordinary thing’ by entering an order
finding Thompson innocent and ordering her immediate release.” Steven Walters &
John Diedrich, Federal Appeals Court Tosses Thompson Case: Ex-state official
freed: Judge calls evidence she steered travel contract ‘beyond thin’, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at A1. Some commentators have argued that the case was
prosecuted, in a heated election year, solely for political reasons in an effort to help
defeat Governor Doyle’s re-election bid. Adam Cohen, Editorial, A Woman Wrongly
Convicted and a U.S. Attorney Who Kept His Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at
A18; Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Conviction may cost Thompson $300,000:
Former state employee in seclusion after release, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 7,
2007, at A1; Stephanie Francis Ward, When Honesty Is Not Best Politics: Courts
struggle with honest-services charges in bribery cases, ABA J., Aug. 2007, at 18, 20.
34
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 883-84.
29
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misused her office, nor had a private gain.35 In doing so, the Seventh
Circuit further clarified the Bloom standard holding “that neither an
increase in salary for doing what one’s superiors deem a good job, nor
an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a ‘private benefit’ for the
purpose of § 1346.”36
But a more nuanced reading of the opinion suggests that, in
refining the Bloom standard, the court may have inadvertently opened
the door to future abuses of the public trust by civil servants. Prior to
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thompson, the Northern District of
Illinois held, on three prior occasions, that one’s job or the prospect of
future employment may serve as a private gain under the Bloom
standard.37 The first case in which this reasoning appeared was United
States v. Bauer,38 later followed by United v States Munson,39 and
United States v. Sorich.40 The government cited to Sorich and Munson
in support of its position in Thompson.41 The Seventh Circuit found
these cases “unpersuasive.”42 But the court did not explain its
reasoning.43
Munson is not readily distinguishable from Thompson, leading to
the conclusion that Thompson simply overrules Sorich, Munson, and
Bauer. Cutting against this conclusion is the court’s language finding
the cases “unpersuasive” rather than simply stating that the cases are
overruled.44 Therefore, it is arguable, and more likely, that the court
was distinguishing Thompson from Sorich, Munson, and Bauer. Sorich
35

Id. at 884.
Id. at 884.
37
United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States
v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274 (N.D. Ill. July 27,
2004); United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 14, 2000).
38
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *10-12.
39
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *3.
40
Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 828-30.
41
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
36
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and Bauer can be readily distinguished from Thompson on the grounds
that Sorich and Bauer held politically appointed policy-making jobs
whose job security depended on the continued election of their
political patrons.45 In contrast, Thompson held a civil servant position
with independent job security,46 and was hired by the previous
administration of the opposing political party.47 Thus, one reading of
Thompson is that a political appointee’s job may serve as a private
gain, but a state civil servant’s job may not. This outcome has the
potential to create an environment where civil servants can make—in
perhaps subtle or Machiavellian ways—political decisions to help
further the careers or reward the friends of their current political
supervisors. In turn, the civil servants can be rewarded as a part of
their normal compensation without the threat of punishment.48 This
outcome potentially continues the graft, or minimally the perception of
corruption, that increases the public’s mistrust of government and
decreases its faith in the political process. Furthermore, this outcome
will undercut the main purpose behind the enactment of § 1346—to
help fight public corruption at the state and local levels.
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit could have avoided the
problems raised by Thompson if it had first decided as a threshold
matter whether or not a “scheme” existed. Although not defined in the
mail fraud statute, one of the dictionary definitions of scheme is “[a]n
artful plot or plan, [usually] to deceive others.”49 When used in a fraud
45

Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000).
46
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 882.
47
Walters & Diedrich, supra note 33.
48
See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884 (“[i]t would stretch the ordinary
understanding of language . . . to call a public employee’s regular compensation,
approved through above-board channels, a kind of ‘private gain’” (emphasis
added)).
49
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (8th ed. 2004); see also WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964) (defining scheme as “a crafty or
unethical project”). Artifice has a similar definition. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
120 (8th ed. 2004) defining artifice as “[a] clever plan or idea, esp. one intended to
deceive.”
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statute it becomes clear that this is the intended meaning of scheme, as
opposed to it meaning “a plan or program of something to be done.”50
Simply put, a “scheme” as defined in the mail fraud statute requires
some nefarious ends.51 An analysis of Thompson will show that there
was no “scheme.” In contrast, an analysis of Sorich, Munson, and
Bauer will show that a “scheme” did exist. In the grand scheme52 of
honest services mail fraud analyses, making the determination of
whether or not a “scheme” exists may be of limited use because most
cases result from bribery or kickback schemes.53 But, Thompson was
prosecuted for honest services fraud in a case where there were no
allegations that she or anyone else had taken a bribe or participated in
a kickback scheme.54 Therefore, it is worth reminding the court to take
a step back and view the whole picture before delving into detailed
legal tests.
Section I of this Note will briefly chronicle the history of the mail
fraud statute, detail the rise of the honest services fraud doctrine, and
review the reasons behind the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
doctrine in McNally and Congress’s restoration of the doctrine through
the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Section II will discuss the Seventh
Circuit’s treatment of honest services fraud post-McNally, and lay out
the Seventh Circuit’s reasons for adopting the misuse of office for
private gain limiting principle in Bloom. The Third Circuit has
criticized and rejected the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard, and
instead has adopted a state law limiting principle. Section II will also
examine the reasoning behind the Third Circuit’s position.
Section III will compare the Seventh and Third Circuits’ standards
to determine if either standard is practically or theoretically superior,
and if the concerns raised by Thompson can be solved by adopting the
50

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964).
See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 729 (1st Cir. 1996) (the
intent of the scheme must be the deprivation of honest services).
52
Using scheme under its definition of “a combination of elements . . . that are
connected, adjusted, and integrated by design.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2029 (1964).
53
See supra note 11.
54
See supra note 26.
51
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Third Circuit’s standard. Section III will conclude that the concerns
raised in Thompson could have been adverted by adopting the Third
Circuit’s standard. But adopting the Third Circuit’s standard would
raise a different set of problems. Therefore, that is not a long-term
solution to the overall questions raised by § 1346. Furthermore it is
likely that both standards lead to the same outcomes under the same
set of facts. Therefore, Section III cannot conclude that either test is
practically or theoretically superior.
Because the Seventh Circuit would gain little benefit from
adopting the Third Circuit’s standard, Section IV examines the private
gain aspect of the Bloom standard. Section IV first details the
conclusions reached by courts in the Northern District of Illinois in the
Sorich, Munson, and Bauer cases—that one’s job or the prospect of
future employment can serve as a private gain under Bloom. Next,
Section IV analyzes how Thompson’s opposite conclusion can lead to
the “subtle schemes” problem based on the political appointee/civil
servant dichotomy that distinguishes Thompson from Sorich and
Bauer.
Section V describes how the Seventh Circuit could have
prevented the “subtle scheme” problem if it had determined as a
threshold matter whether or not a “scheme” existed. Had the court
made this threshold determination it could have reached the same
result in Thompson without having to discuss the private gain issue
because Section V will show that there was no “scheme” in Thompson,
while a “scheme” did exist in Sorich, Munson, and Bauer. Making the
threshold determination, however, may be difficult in cases, such as
Thompson and Bauer, where only one civil servant is acting. Section V
deals with the problem by proposing the adoption of a business
judgment rule to assist in determining whether or not a scheme exists.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Early History
The current mail fraud statute traces its origins to the 1872
reorganization and recodification of the then existing postal laws.55 In
the years after the Civil War, along with the growth of the national
economy, the country experienced an increase in the number of largescale financial frauds.56 Prior to the Civil War, despite Congress’s
power to establish the post office,57 the prevailing view was that it
lacked the power to regulate any material, including objectionable
material, placed in the mails.58 After the Civil War, the northern view
of federal power—that Congress had the power to prevent the mails
from being used for illegal purposes—prevailed, although certain
tactics were prohibited.59
Despite this new view of federal power, the language of the
original mail fraud statute suggests that Congress was still concerned
that the law might be stuck down as unconstitutional.60 In an effort to
prevent this outcome, Congress relied heavily on its power to prevent
the misuse of the mails, perhaps explaining much of the superfluous
“mail-emphasizing” language.61 Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s
55

McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987). For a detailed history
of the mail fraud statute see Rakoff, supra note 1.
56
See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878); Rakoff, supra note 1, at 780.
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
58
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 781.
59
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 781. Tactics that were prohibited included the
opening of sealed letters. Id.
60
Id. at 785-86.
61
See id. The original mail fraud statute stated:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, [to] be effected by either opening or
intending to open correspondence or communication with any
other person (whether resident within or outside the United States),
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ruling in Ex parte Jackson62 put to rest the idea that the mailemphasizing language was needed.63 But because the language
existed, it led to divergent statutory interpretations in the lower
courts.64 Under the strict view, the mail emphasizing language allowed
for the prosecution of only those frauds that were “dependent” on the
by means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or
by inciting such other person to open communication with the
person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such
scheme or artifice (or attempting so to do), place any letter or
packet in any post-office of the United States, or take or receive
any therefrom, such person, so misusing the post-office
establishment, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be
punished with a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, with or
without such imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding
eighteen calendar months. The indictment, information, or
complaint may severally charge offenses to the number of three
when committed within the same six calendar months; but the
court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion
the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the
post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such
fraudulent scheme and device.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (1872) (codified at
U.S. Rev. Stat. § 5480 (1875) (emphasis added). See Rakoff, supra note 1,
at 785-86 (explaining why the emphasized language is unnecessary, and
speculating that Congress included it to ground the statute in its powers to
prevent the misuse of the mails because of its fear that the statute would be
struck down as unconstitutional).
62
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
63
See id. (upholding the illegal lottery statute). The illegal lottery statute was
incorporated in the same Act as the mail fraud statute, but was contained in a
separate section. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 302 (1872) (codified at
U.S. Rev. Stat. § 3894 (1875)). In upholding the power of Congress to prevent
illegal lottery material from being sent through the mails, the Court stated “[t]he
power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire postal system of
the country. The right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the
right to determine what shall be excluded.” Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S at 732. For a
discussion of the effect of the Court’s decision in Ex parte Jackson on the
interpretation of the mail fraud statute see Rakoff, supra note 1, at 787-90.
64
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 789-90.
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mails.65 But under the broad view the mail fraud statute could be used
to punish any fraud so long as it was furthered by the “abuse” of the
mails.66
For nearly two decades, the lower courts were split between the
strict and broad interpretations, and the Supreme Court did not take
any cases to resolve the dispute.67 In 1889, Congress amended the mail
fraud statue to include a list of specific schemes.68 If this was an
attempt to resolve the issue of strict versus broad interpretation, it
probably would have failed.69 We will never know because the lower
courts did not get the opportunity to interpret the new language.70
Instead, in 1896, the Supreme Court’s decision in Durland v. United
States71 undercut the support for the strict view and set the stage for
the broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute.72
65

Id. at 790. For a discussion of the strict view of the original mail fraud
statute see id. at 790-95.
66
Id. For a discussion of the broad view of the original mail fraud statute see
id. at 795-801.
67
Id. at 809. During this time two cases, In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372 (1887) and
United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483 (1888), did come before the Supreme Court, but
they were decided on technical matters, and not on the scope of the mail fraud
statute. Id. at 808.
68
Id. at 809 (citing Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393 § 1, 25 Stat. 873).
69
Id. The courts that had broadly interpreted the statue likely would have
continued to do so under the belief that this was what Congress intended when it
continued to add to the list of frauds. Id. But, the new list of items could also confirm
the strict constructionist view that only the listed frauds were intended to be covered.
Id.
70
Id. at 810.
71
161 U.S. 306 (1896).
72
See Rakoff, supra note 1, at 811 (“the broad and conclusory language used
by Justice Brewer exemplifies reasoning typical of the broad constructionist
decisions and gives not the slightest hint of support for the strict constructionists’
approach”); Moohr, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussion expansive interpretations of the
mail fraud statute). See also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987)
(“the phrase [scheme or artifice to defraud] is to be interpreted broadly insofar as
property rights are concerned”).
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In Durland, the first case to interpret the language73 “any scheme
or artifice to defraud,” the defendant argued that the mail fraud statute
was limited to the common law definition of “false pretenses”—that
only past conduct, but not future conduct could be punished.74 The
Court rejected this argument and held that the mail fraud statute
reached to both past and present conduct, as well as to future
promises.75 The Durland holding was later codified in the 1909
amendment to the mail fraud statute.76 After Durland, the mail fraud
statute remained virtually unchanged, except for a revision in 1948 to
modernize the language, remove surplusage, and to recodify the
statute at its present location—18 U.S.C. § 1341.77
In the nearly hundred years since the 1909 amendment, the
mailing element has been reduced to nothing more than a means of
providing federal jurisdiction.78 Despite this development, some courts
continue to misplace emphasis on the mailing element instead of
focusing on the core issue: the definition of the term “scheme to
defraud.”79 Perhaps courts have not defined “scheme to defraud”
because they want to adhere to Congress’s intent—arguably its intent
from the very beginning—to apply the mail fraud statute broadly.80 By
defining a “scheme to defraud” the courts might leave something
outside of the definition that Congress intended to include. Chief
Justice Burger characterized the mail fraud statute as the “first line of
73

McNally, 483 U.S. at 356.
Durland, 161 U.S. at 312.
75
Id. at 313.
76
McNally, 483 U.S. at 357. The 1909 amendment also eliminated the list of
schemes added in 1889 and removed the second element, which required proof that
the defendant intended to both defraud and misuse the mails. Rakoff, supra note 1, at
816.
77
Brian C. Behrens, Note, 18 U.S.C. section 1341 and section 1346:
Deciphering the Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 489, 497 (1993).
78
Moohr, supra note 2, at 6-7.
79
Rakoff, supra note 1, at 822 (concluding that the focus on the mailing
element is “misplaced and serves no useful function”).
80
Id.
74

98
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

defense” against new types of fraud.81 He described the mail fraud
statute as a “stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new
[frauds], until particularized legislation can be developed and passed
to deal directly with the evil.”82 Although not new, public corruption is
a type of fraud that came under the ambit of the mail fraud statute
beginning in the 1970s, under the honest services fraud doctrine.83
B. Development of the Honest Services Fraud Doctrine
The honest services fraud doctrine resulted from federal
prosecutors’ novel combination of the “intangible rights” and “honest
services” theories.84 The intangible rights theory was predicated upon
the court’s removal of the pecuniary loss requirement for obtaining a
fraud conviction.85 Traditionally, the words “to defraud” referred to the
harming of one’s property rights.86 But in the early twentieth century,
the Supreme Court removed the requirement of a pecuniary loss in a
series of decisions interpreting various fraud statutes, but not in the
mail fraud statute.87 For example, in Hammerschmidt v. United States,
81

United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 405.
83
Moohr, supra note 2, at 2; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93; Tendler, supra
note 2, at 2730.
84
Moorh, supra note 2, at 8; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790-94; Tendler, supra
note 2, at 2733-34.
85
Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790.
86
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (citing Hammerschmidt
v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail
Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 153, 163 (1994) [hereinafter Moohr, Someone to Watch Over Us].
87
Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910) (construing the conspiracy to
defraud statute as broad enough to reach “any conspiracy for the purpose of
impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of
government”). See also Kobrin supra note 2, at 790 n.50 citing to United States v.
Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1915) (government does not have to prove that a
defrauded victim of a defendant impersonating a federal employee or officer lost
anything of value) and United States v. Plyler, 222 U.S. 15, 16 (1911) (government
does not have to prove a financial loss to bring a case against a defendant who
82
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the Supreme Court, interpreting the conspiracy to defraud statute,
concluded that the government was not only defrauded when it was
cheated out of money or property, but also when someone interferes
with its “lawful governmental functions.”88 The Court further stated
that “[i]t is not necessary that the Government shall be subjected to
property or pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that its legitimate
official action and purpose shall be defeated by the misrepresentation,
chicane or the overreaching of those charged with carrying out the
governmental intention.”89
The honest services theory traces its origins to the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Shushan v. United States.90 In Sushan, members of the
Orleans Parish Levee Board, two bond dealers, and a public
accountant engaged in a scheme to charge excessive fees in a bond
refinancing deal.91 They were convicted of violating the mail fraud
statute under the theory that their representations were false because of
the excessive fees, and because the Levee Board was “deprived of
[the] fair judgment of one of its members,” as a result of the bribes
that were paid as part of the scheme.92 The court stated that a scheme
forged and presented papers certifying his character to the Civil Service
Commission) that based their holdings on Haas.
88
265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
89
Id.
90
117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941). See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d
1124, 1150 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973). “In
Shushan there is the implication that a scheme to gain personal favors from public
officials is a scheme to defraud the public, although the interest lost by the public
can be described no more concretely than as an intangible right to the proper and
honest administration of government.” States, 488 F.2d at 766. Shushan is often
cited to as the basis for the intangible rights doctrine as well. Kobrin, supra note 2, at
792-93. For the argument that courts misinterpreted Shushan as the basis for the
intangible rights doctrine, and a prescient view of the Supreme Court’s holding in
McNally that the mail fraud is limited to frauds that result in the gain of money or
property, see W. Robert Gray, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and PoliticalCorruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHI. L. REV.
562, 584-88 (1980).
91
117 F.2d at 114.
92
Id. at 113-15.
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to defraud exists even in the absence of any misrepresentations if one
betrays another or corrupts another’s advisor to gain money unfairly.93
It further stated that a person who bribes a public official to obtain
more favorable terms in a public contract not only commits the crime
of bribery, but also engages in a “scheme to defraud the public.”94
Finally, in what ultimately became the basis for the honest services
theory, the court stated, “[n]o trustee has more sacred duties than a
public official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting [a
public official] must in the federal law be considered a scheme to
defraud.”95
While Shushan may have planted the seeds for the honest services
fraud doctrine, it was not until the 1970s, when federal prosecutors
were specifically charged with fighting public corruption, that the
doctrine took root and started to bear fruit.96 To battle public
corruption, innovative prosecutors combined the “intangible rights”
theory that fraud is not limited to the loss of money or property with
the “honest services” theory that governmental officials owe fiduciary
duties to the public.97 The combination of the two theories resulted in
the birth of the honest services fraud doctrine under which the mere
breach of a fiduciary duty could be punished under the mail fraud
statute, regardless of whether or not the public has suffered a tangible
harm.98 One of the first cases prosecuted under the honest services
fraud doctrine, and perhaps a paradigm case of the doctrine, was
United States v. Isaacs.99

93

Id.
Id.
95
Id.
96
Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93.
97
Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93.
98
Moohr, supra note 2, at 8-11; Kobrin, supra note 2, at 792-93. Although
Shushan is sometimes cited as the origin of the intangible rights theory, the
intangible rights language in the case is likely dictum given that the court found that
the Orleans Parish Levee Board suffered a tangible loss. Shushan, 117 F.2d at 119;
see also Kobrin, supra note 2, at 790.
99
493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). See Kobrin, supra note 2, at 793.
94
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In 1973, Otto Kerner,100 former Illinois Governor, and Theodore
Isaacs, Illinois Director of Revenue under Kerner, were convicted on a
variety of charges, including honest services mail fraud, for accepting
bribes in return for promoting certain horse racing interests.101 Kerner
and Isaacs challenged their mail fraud convictions arguing that neither
the State of Illinois nor its citizens were defrauded of money or
property.102 In fact, as result of their actions, state revenue from horse
racing doubled.103 Despite the increase in state revenue, the Seventh
Circuit upheld their convictions. The court first quoted the language in
Hammerschmidt that for fraud it is not necessary that the government
suffer a pecuniary loss, but only that its legitimate actions are
defeated.104 The court next quoted the “sacred duties” language in
Shushan, and the language stating that a scheme to bribe a public
official is also a scheme to defraud the public.105 Finally, the court
concluded that Kerner deprived the State of Illinois and it citizens of
his honest services.106
After Isaacs and a few additional groundbreaking cases,107 the
honest service fraud doctrine was frequently used in the fight against
public corruption, and was later extended to private breaches of
fiduciary duty, most notably in the corporate context.108 During this
time, each of the Circuits adopted some form of the honest services

100

At the time of his conviction, Otto Kerner was a sitting United States
Circuit Judge in the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1140.
101
Id. at 1131.
102
Id. at 1149.
103
Id. at 1139.
104
Id. at 1150.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United
States v. States, 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973).
108
Kobrin, supra note 2, at 794; Tendler, supra note 2, at 2733-35.

102
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

fraud doctrine. 109 But, the doctrine suffered a major blow in 1987
when the Supreme Court decided McNally v. United States.110
C. Rejection and Restoration of the Honest Services Fraud Doctrine
McNally arose out of an insurance kickback scheme between a
Kentucky state official and Charles McNally, the nominal owner of the
insurance agency through which the payments were funneled.111 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed both of their convictions for mail fraud under
the honest services fraud doctrine, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine the doctrine’s validity.112 The Court rejected the
honest services fraud doctrine, holding that the mail fraud statute was
limited to frauds involving money or property.113
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first noted that the text of
the statute clearly protects property rights, but does not mention the
citizenry’s right to good government.114 Reviewing the history of the
statute, the Court concluded that under Durland, the term “scheme or
artifice to defraud” was to be given a broad reading only in the context
of property rights; nothing “indicate[d] that the statute had a more
extensive reach.”115 Next, the Court recognized that, in 1909,
Congress codified Durland’s holding by “add[ing] the words ‘or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises’ after the original phrase ‘any scheme or
artifice to defraud.’’’116 The question the Court faced was whether
Congress intended to reach nontraditional frauds under the mail fraud
statute when it used the word “or” between the original language and

109

See supra note 16.
483 U.S. 350 (1987).
111
Id. at 352-53.
112
Id. at 355-56.
113
Id. at 359-60.
114
Id. at 356.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 357.
110
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the 1909 Amendment.117 The Court concluded it did not, and that
Congress was instead following the common understanding that the
mail fraud statute was limited to the protection of property rights.118
The Court began its legal analysis by stating “[b]ecause the two
phrases identifying the proscribed schemes appear in the disjunctive, it
is arguable that they are to be construed independently and that the
money-or-property requirement of the latter phrase does not limit
schemes to defraud to those aimed at causing deprivation of money or
property.”119 The Court explained that this was the reading given to the
statute by the Courts of Appeals in approving the honest services fraud
doctrine.120 The Court then concluded that when Congress amended
the mail fraud statute in 1909 it was not departing from the common
understanding that fraud was limited to harming one’s property
rights.121 In reaching this conclusion the Court analyzed the language
from Hammerschmidt stating that it was fraudulent to interfere with
lawful government functions.122 The Court, however, concluded that
the Hammerschmidt language was “based on a consideration not
117

Id. at 358. The mail fraud statute in effect at the time of McNally read in
pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, [uses the mails or causes them
to be used], shall be fined not more than $ 1,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
Id. at 352 (emphasis added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341).
118
McNally, 483 U.S. at 358-59.
119
Id. at 358.
120
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973)
(rejecting the appellant’s conjunctive reading of the statute and stating, “[t]he more
natural construction of the wording in the statute is to view the two phrases
independently.”)
121
McNally, 483 U.S. at 358.
122
Id. at 359 n.8.

104
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

19

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

applicable to the mail fraud statute.”123 Finally, the Court, noting
federalism as well as vagueness concerns, invoked the rule of lenity to
limit the mail fraud statute to “the protection of property rights.”124
Before applying its holding to the to McNally facts, the Court stated
that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly
than it has.”125
The following year Congress expressed its disapproval of the
Supreme Court’s decision in McNally by resurrecting the honest
services fraud doctrine through an amendment to the mail fraud statute
that it buried in one of the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988 (“ADAA”).126 Although Congress had previously considered
bills with more comprehensive language recognizing the citizenry’s
right to good government,127 the amendment in the ADAA, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1346, simply states “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the
term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”128
Noticeably lacking, however, is a definition of the terms “intangible
rights” and “honest services.” Thus, while courts agree that § 1346
was intended to legislatively override McNally, 129 its imprecise
123

Id.
Id. at 360.
125
Id.
126
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346). See also Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as
a Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
367, 488-91 (1989); Moohr, Someone To Watch Over Us, supra note 86, at 169. For
the argument that the court did not “speak more clearly” see Judge Jolly’s dissenting
opinion in United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 736-49 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Jolly, J., dissenting).
127
Brumley, 116 F.3d at 742-45 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
128
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508 (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346).
129
See, e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 134-36 (2d Cir. 2003) (en
banc); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 689-90 (3d Cir. 2002); United States
v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346,
363-64 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723-24 (1st Cir.
1996).
124
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language has led to new problems, while simultaneously leaving prior
problems unresolved. 130
Section 1346 has been frequently challenged on vagueness
grounds, 131 and that it violates the principles of federalism because it
involves the federal government in matters that are primarily a state
concern.132 Because courts are concerned that the boundaries of §
1346 remain unclear, they have adopted limiting principles to uphold
the constitutionality of the statute and to counter the vagueness and
federalism concerns.133
II. POST-MCNALLY HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
A. Seventh Circuit’s Decision in Bloom
The Seventh Circuit adopted the limiting principle of “misuse of
office . . . for private gain” in United States v. Bloom.134 In Bloom,
Lawrence Bloom, a Chicago alderman and part-time private attorney,
was accused of giving legal advice to a private client about how to
retain its real property without paying a large portion of its past-due
130

Behrens, supra note 77, at 515; Kurland, supra note 126, at 490; Moohr,
Someone To Watch Over Us, supra note 86, at 170.
131
See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698-699 (7th Cir. 2007) (§ 1346
is not unconstitutional as applied); Rybicki, 354 F.3d at137 n.10; Frost, 125 F.3d at
371 (§ 1346 is not facially unconstitutional); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564,
568-569 (11th Cir. 1995) (§ 1346 is not unconstitutional as applied). A panel of the
Second Circuit is the only court to have found § 1346 unconstitutionally vague as
applied. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2002). The Handakas
court would have also found § 1346 facially unconstitutional if it had been the first
panel in the Second Circuit to address the issue. Id. at 104. Handakas, however, was
overruled by the Second Circuit sitting en banc in Rybicki. 354 F.3d at 144 (although
not deciding the vagueness issue on its merits, the en banc court held the Handakas
panel should not have reached the constitutional question; therefore, its vagueness
holding was overruled).
132
See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, (5th Cir. 1997) (en
banc); Beale, supra note 16; Moohr, Someone to Watch Over Us, supra note 86.
133
See supra note 21.
134
149 F.3d at 655 (1998).
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property taxes.135 Bloom allegedly informed his client that, although
illegal, it could avoid paying back taxes by sending a straw bidder to
the tax scavenger sale to purchase the property, and then having the
straw bidder re-convey the property back to the client after the
expiration of the redemption period.136 As a result of giving this
advice, Bloom was charged under § 1346 of depriving the City of
Chicago of his honest services.137
The honest services fraud charge was dismissed by the district
court, and came before the Seventh Circuit on the government’s
interlocutory appeal.138 In affirming the district court, the Seventh
Circuit rejected the government’s position that “public employees may
not do anything in their private lives that acts against the City’s
interests.”139 The court believed that the government’s position would
result in the creation of an “impermissible federal common-law
crime,” and noted that it has long been held that “[n]ot every breach of
every fiduciary duty works a criminal fraud.”140 Because not every
breach of a fiduciary duty is a criminal fraud, the Seventh Circuit next
faced the difficult task of determining where to draw the line between
fiduciary duty breaches that work a criminal fraud and those that do
not.141
135

Id. at 650-51. In Chicago, aldermanic positions are part-time. Id. at 650.
Id. at 651. Under Illinois law a bidder at a tax scavenger sale takes the
property free and clear of the tax lien at the expiration of the redemption period. Id.
The original owner can redeem the property during the redemption period by paying
all back taxes and interest. Id. Illinois law also allows the winning bidder to sell the
property back to the original owner, despite its effect of wiping out the back taxes.
Id. But it is illegal for the original owner or her agent to bid on the property during
the scavenger sale, and bidders must certify that they are not associated with the
original owner. Id.
137
Id. Although the property taxes were owed to the county, the prosecutor’s
theory was that the City of Chicago was deprived of Bloom’s honest services
because the property tax money collected by the county flows through to the City.
Id. at 650.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 654.
140
Id. (citing United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973)).
141
Id.
136
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The court first looked to the language of the §§ 1341 and 1346,
but found no help in the text of either statute. Next, the court
considered the breach of a fiduciary duty and the violation of “some
other rule of law” as a limiting principle.142 The court rejected this
approach based on two shortcomings when applied to Bloom’s
situation.143 First, Bloom did not violate the tax scavenger sale law, his
client and the straw purchaser did; and second, the client’s violation of
the law had nothing to do with Bloom’s status as an alderman.144
The court went on to express its concern that the government’s
theory would turn lawful actions under state law into federal crimes.145
According to the court, that is the situation where the fiduciary status
would matter because under the honest services fraud doctrine the
government does not have to lose money or property, but only its
employee’s loyalty.146 The court gave as an example the hypothetical
situation where Bloom only explained the scavenger sale law to his
client, and told the client not to send a straw purchaser, but instead
purchase the property back from the independent winning bidder.147
Another situation hypothesized by the court was where Bloom advised
his client to move to the suburbs where taxes are cheaper. Under these
situations, although acting lawfully, according to the prosecution’s
theory he still deprived City of Chicago of his “complete loyalty.”148
The court found that this outcome would stretch the honest services
fraud doctrine “beyond sensible bounds.”149
The weakness of this analysis is that the court does not articulate
why the limiting principle of the violation of another law along with
the fiduciary duty breach would not address this concern.150 If that
142

Id.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 655.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 691-93 (3d Cir. 2002).
143
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standard had been adopted then there can be no concern that the public
official was acting lawfully. In fact, the dissenting opinion highlights
that Bloom likely violated an independent law concerning an official’s
interest in the purchase of property sold for tax assessments.151 If
Bloom did indeed violate this law, then he was acting unlawfully while
simultaneously breaching his fiduciary duty and the majority’s
hypothetical concern that Bloom was acting lawfully and breaching a
fiduciary duty is negated.
But the dissenting opinion is based on the assumption that a
lawyer has an interest in the results of his advice.152 If one takes this
assumption and applies it to the majority’s hypo where Bloom acts
lawfully by just describing the scavenger sale law and explaining how
the client can purchase the property from the winning bidder, then
Bloom may have still committed honest services fraud. If he has an
interest in his advice, even if that advice was to act lawfully, and that
151

Bloom, 149 F.3d at 657-59 (Bauer, J., dissenting). Judge Bauer believes that
Bloom violated 65 ILCS 5/3.1-55-10. The pertinent part of the statute cited by Judge
Bauer is:
Interests in contracts
(a) A municipal officer shall not be interested, directly or
indirectly, in the officer's own name or in the name of any
other person, association, trust, or corporation, in any contract,
work or business of the municipality or in the sale of any
article whenever the expense, price, or consideration of the
contract, work business, or sale is paid either from the treasury
or by an assessment levied by statute or ordinance. A
municipal officer shall not be interested, directly or indirectly,
in the purchase of any property that (i) belongs to the
municipality, (ii) is sold for taxes or assessments, or (iii) is
sold by virtue of legal process at the suit of the municipality.
...
(e) An officer who violates this Section is guilty of a
Class 4 felony. In addition, any office held by an officer so
convicted shall become vacant and shall be so declared as part
of the judgment of the court.
Id. at 658 (emphasis in original).
152
Id. at 657-58.

109
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/5

24

Lapointe: Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Seventh Circuit’s Refinemen

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

advice was used for the purchase of property sold for taxes, then he
has violated another law and breached his fiduciary duty. Thus, he
could be charged with honest services fraud despite giving proper
legal advice. This appears to be the absurd result with which the
majority was concerned in rejecting the limiting principle of the
violation of another law and the breach of a fiduciary duty.153
To determine fiduciary duty breaches that are frauds from those
that are not, the Seventh Circuit held that the “[m]isuse of office (more
broadly, misuse of position) for private gain is the line that separates
run of the mill violations of state-law fiduciary duty . . . from federal
crime.”154 The court reached this conclusion based on the Supreme
Court’s description of the honest services fraud doctrine in McNally,
where the Court stated “a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the
public, and misuse of his office for private gain is a fraud.”155 In
reaching this conclusion the Seventh Circuit found that § 1346 did not
make lawful pre-McNally conduct unlawful post-McNally.156 Thus,
because Bloom was not charged with misusing his public office for
private gain, the honest services fraud charge was properly dismissed
by the district court.157
Although many appellate courts agree that limiting principles
need to be applied to § 1346 in order to cabin its reach and to reduce
federalism and vagueness concerns,158 the Seventh Circuit is the only
circuit to adopt the “misuse of office for private gain” standard.159 The
153

See id. at 654-55 (majority opinion).
Id. at 655.
155
Id. (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 355 (1987)).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-93 (3d Cir. 2002); Bloom, 149 F.3d at
654-55; United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 732-34 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc);
United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 725 (1st Cir. 1996).
159
United States v. Malone, No. 02:03-CR-00500-LRH-LRL, 2006 WL
2583293, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 6, 2006); Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud &
RICO Racket: Thoughts on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 113, 115
(2006).
154
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Third Circuit has expressly criticized the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom
standard.160
B. THIRD CIRCUIT CRITICISM OF BLOOM
In United States v. Panarella, the Third Circuit rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard, and adopted the violation of a state
law as its limiting principle.161 In Panarella, Nicholas Panarella ran a
tax collection business that had expertise in collecting Pennsylvania’s
business privilege tax from non-Pennsylvania businesses.162 Panarella
hired Pennsylvania Senate Majority Leader F. Joseph Loeper as a
consultant for his business.163 Loeper supported the business by
attending meetings between Panarella and local governments and state
agencies.164 Loeper also spoke and voted against legislation that would
have been detrimental to Panarella’s business.165 Loeper and Panarella
ran into trouble when Loeper failed to disclose, as required under
Pennsylvania law, the income that he received from Panarella.166 They
dug themselves a deeper hole when together they tried to cover-up the
arrangement from a reporter investigating the payments.167 Panarella
was indicted by the grand jury on honest services fraud charges for
depriving the public of Loeper’s honest services.168 He pled guilty, but
appealed arguing that Loeper did not deprive the public of his honest
services.169
160

Panarella, 277 F.3d at 691-93.
Id.
162
Id. at 681.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. In addition to the mail fraud charges, Panarella was also indicted on wire
fraud charges. Id. The wire fraud statute and the mail fraud statute are read together.
United States v. Brumley, 59 F.3d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1995).
169
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 679.
161
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The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that honest services
fraud typically results from either bribery or the failure to disclose a
conflict of interest that results in private gain.170 Panarella involved the
latter issue and the court held that “where a public official takes
discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a
financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state
criminal law, that official has deprived the public of his honest
services under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.”171 On appeal, Panarella argued that
the Third Circuit should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s Bloom
standard.172 The Third Circuit refused because it believed that the
violation of state law served as a better limiting principle.173
In rejecting the Bloom standard, the Third Circuit first noted that
Bloom was factually distinguishable from Panarella because Bloom’s
actions were not taken as part of his official duties, while Loeper’s
actions were taken in his official capacity.174 But more importantly, the
Third Circuit found that the Bloom standard offered “little clarity” in
determining the scope of § 1346.175 The court went on to state that the
dispute over the “misuse of office” and the “private gain” added “an
extra layer of unnecessary complexity to the inquiry.”176 Furthermore,
the Third Circuit reasoned that the Bloom standard was both overinclusive and under-inclusive.177 The court reasoned that the standard
was over-inclusive because it could hypothetically cover an official
who seduces an intern or takes home office supplies for personal
use.178 It was under-inclusive because if the court adopted Panarella’s
position—that a public official does not misuse his office when he
170

Id. at 690. (citing United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir.
2001) and United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998)).
171
Id. at 691.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 692-93.
174
Id. at 691.
175
Id. at 692.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
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fails to disclose a conflict of interest—then the Bloom standard would
not cover a classic fraudulent situation.179
In adopting state law as its limiting principle, the Third Circuit’s
answer to the Seventh Circuit’s concerns about the principle’s
shortcomings was that under a state law limiting principle Bloom
simply did not commit honest services mail fraud. The Third Circuit
further concluded that state law better handles vaguenes and
federalism concerns.180 Because Pennsylvania criminal law required
Loeper to disclose the income he received from Panarella, both parties
had “unambiguous notice that Loeper’s nondisclosure was
criminal.”181 Thus, according to the Third Circuit, vagueness concerns
were not present in Panarella.182 Additionally, federalism concerns
were mitigated because the additional violation of a state law is
“conduct that the state itself has chosen to criminalize.”183 Moreover,
federal prosecutions in the area of political corruption can play a
“beneficial role” because state officials are often either unwilling or
unable to prosecute these cases.184
Two issues were left unresolved by the Third Circuit’s decision in
Panarella. First, whether nondisclosure always requires the violation
of a state law in order to amount to honest services fraud,185 and
second, whether the violated state law must be a criminal law. The
second question was answered in the negative in United States v.

179

Id. A traditional fraudulent situation occurs when a fiduciary fails to
disclose a conflict of interest. Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 698.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 694.
184
Id. For a detailed analysis of this problem see Michael W. Carey et al.,
Federal Prosecution of State and Local Public Officials: Obstacles to Punishing
Breaches of the Public Trust and a Proposal for Reform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L.
REV. 301 (1992).
185
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 699 n.9. The Third Circuit further declined to
answer the question in United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Gordon, when the Third Circuit held that honest services fraud only
requires the violation of a state-created fiduciary duty.186
After Gordon, the Third Circuit’s standard for determining the
outer reaches of the honest services fraud doctrine seems to be
somewhat settled, although certain questions remain.187 Likewise, after
Thompson, the same can be said of the Seventh Circuit.188 The
extraordinary facts of Thompson, however, suggest that the case lies at
the outer edges of the honest services fraud doctrine. Therefore, the
186

183 Fed. Appx. 202, 211, No. 05-3927, 2006 WL 1558952, at *8 (3d Cir.
2006). Gordon was not selected to be published and is therefore not precedent in the
Third Circuit. 3d Cir. Internal Operating P. 5.7 (citation of non-precedential 3d Cir.
opinions).
187
For example, it is at least arguable that the Third Circuit has left open the
question of whether a violation of a state-law-created fiduciary duty is required in
non-disclosure cases. In Gordon, the Third Circuit states that in Murphy, 323 F. 3d
102, the court approved of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Brumley,
116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), that “§ 1346 ‘contemplates that there must
first be a breach of a state-owned duty.’” Gordon, 183 Fed. Appx. at 211 n.6, 2006
WL 1558952, at *7 n.6. But in Murphy, the court says that it will not address the
issue of whether a violation of a state-law-created fiduciary is required. Murphy, 323
F.3d at 117. Thus, the holding in Gordon is potentially weakened because the
Murphy court specifically stated that it would not address the issue. Furthermore, the
Third Circuit potentially misreads Brumley, 116 F.3d 728. In Brumley the Fifth
Circuit held that for honest services fraud the “services must be owed under state law
and the government must prove . . . that they were not delivered. 116 F.3d at 734.
Therefore, the language quoted by the Third Circuit in Gordon that the Fifth Circuit
requires a breach of a fiduciary duty is likely dictum in the Fifth Circuit because the
Fifth Circuit did not reach the question of whether a breach of a state created
fiduciary duty is required; it simple held that state-owed “services” must not have
been delivered. Id. at 734. The Third Circuit is not the only court to make this
mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Kott, No. 3:07-cr-00056 JWS, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 66125, at *12-13 (D. Alaska Sept. 4, 2007).
Another open question is which state laws create fiduciary duties and under
what circumstances. See, e.g., Murphy, 323 F.3d at 117 (rejecting the government’s
argument that the New Jersey Bribery Act creates a fiduciary duty between a
political party official and the public).
188
Although the Seventh Circuit held that neither salary increases (for doing a
good job) nor psychic benefits are a private gain, the ultimate contours of the private
gain test remain unclear. See United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir.
2007).
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Thompson case provides an opportunity to compare and contrast the
Seventh Circuit’s Bloom standard with the Third Circuit’s Panarella
standard to determine if one of the tests is theoretically or practically
better than the other.
III. COMPARISON OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S BLOOM STANDARD WITH
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S PANARELLA STANDARD
A. Applying the Third Circuit’s Test to the Facts of Thompson
In Thompson, a Wisconsin civil servant supervised the process of
awarding a state travel contract.189 Administrative rules dictated that
the contract was to be awarded to the company with the greatest
number of points out of three weighted categories.190 Two companies
emerged as the leading bidders for the contract.191 The first, Aldelman
Travel, was a local Wisconsin company that had made political
donations to the governor; the other company, Omega World Travel,
was based on the East Coast.192 After the evaluation process, although
the Adelman had the lowest price and a better service score, Omega
received the highest overall score because they delivered a better oral
presentation.193
But, for unstated “political reasons,” Thompson did not want to
award the contract to Omega.194 To prevent this outcome, she first
negotiated with the other members of the evaluation committee in an
attempt to get them to change their scores.195 Her negotiations failed,
but another member of the committee suggested that the contract be

189

Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878.
Id. The points scale provided for 1200 maximum points: 300 points for
price, 700 points for service, and 200 points for the oral presentation. Id.
191
Id. at 878-79.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 879.
190
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re-bid on a best-and-final basis, as permitted by state law.196 Adelman
lowered its price, and a virtual tie with Omega ensued.197 Thompson
then used Wisconsin’s administrative tie-breaking procedure to award
the contract to Adelman with the consent of her political appointee
supervisor.198 As a result of steering the contract to Adelman,
Thompson was convicted of honest services mail fraud.199 The
Seventh Circuit reversed Thompson’s conviction, finding that under
the Bloom standard she neither misused her office, nor had a private
gain.200 But how would this case have come out if it had arisen in the
Third Circuit?
First, the government would have had to find a state-law-created
fiduciary duty that Thompson might have violated.201 Assuming that
government found one, it would next have to prove that she breached
that duty. As the Third Circuit and others have noted, most cases of
honest services fraud result from either bribery or the failure to
disclose a conflict of interest.202 Although Thompson was also
convicted under a bribery and theft statute, she was convicted under
the theory that she “misapplied” federal funds and not on a bribery
theory.203 The Seventh Circuit found that there was no indication that
196

Id.
Id. “The tie depended on rounding to the nearest whole number.
[Adelman’s] score was 1026.6, while [Omega’s] score was 1027.3”. Id.
198
Id. The tie-breaking procedure “gave weight to items not previously figured
into the price comparison.” Id.
199
Id. at 878.
200
Id. at 883-84.
201
See United States v. Gordon, 183 Fed. Appx. 202, 211, No. 05-3927, 2006
WL 1558952, at *8 (3d Cir. June 8, 2006). One possible option is the section of the
Wisconsin Ethics Code that states in pertinent part that “[n]o state public official
may use or attempt to use the public position held by the public official to influence
or gain unlawful benefits, advantages or privileges personally or for others.” WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 19.45(5) (2003).
202
See, e.g., United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 2002);
United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1998).
203
See supra note 26.
197
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Thompson or anyone else had accepted a bribe.204 Thus, the
government would likely have had to rely on the “failure to disclose a
conflict of interest” theory.
Building a case on the failure to disclose theory would be
problematic for the government for several reasons. First, as a civil
servant, it is questionable whether Thompson would be subject to the
same disclosure requirements as an elected official under Wisconsin
law.205 Second, it is debatable whether her “political” motivations
created a conflict in the first place because she was not bribed and did
not have any connection to Adelman.206 But perhaps most fatal to the
government’s case is the fact that Thompson did disclose her “political
concerns” to the evaluation committee.207
A problem that arises in analyzing Thompson under Third Circuit
precedent in non-disclosure cases is that Wisconsin’s disclosure laws
appear more lenient that Pennsylvania’s disclosure laws.208 For
example, Pennsylvania defines the term “public employee” in a way
that would clearly cover Thompson, and require her to comply with its
disclosure laws.209 Wisconsin’s disclosure laws do not define the term
“pubic employee,” and it is not as clear if she would have to comply
with them.210 But the Third Circuit’s language in United States v.
Antico—that “[d]uties to disclose material information affecting an
official's impartial decision-making . . . exist . . . regardless of a state
204

Id.
The Wisconsin Code of Ethics does not define the term “public employee”
so it is unclear whether or not a Thompson would have to file a disclosure statement.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.42 (West Supp. 2007). See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.43 (West
Supp. 2007) for Wisconsin’s disclosure requirements. On the other hand,
Pennsylvania, the location of Panarella, does define the term “public employee” in
its ethical code. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West Supp. 2007). Public
employees are required to file disclosure statements. 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1104(a) (2000).
206
See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879.
207
Id. at 878-79.
208
See supra note 205.
209
Id.
210
Id.
205
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or local law codifying a conflict of interest”—makes clear that some
type of disclosure is needed.211 Thus, if Thompson did not have to
comply with Wisconsin’s disclosure laws, to who was she supposed to
disclose the potential conflict.
In this circumstance, Antico suggests that disclosing to a
supervisor may be sufficient.212 In that case Frank Antico worked in
various positions in Philadelphia’s Department of Licenses and
Inspections.213 In several of the positions he held “discretionary
authority to approve zoning and use permits and licenses.”214 Antico
failed to pay child support to his children living with his exgirlfriend.215 She sued and was awarded child support.216 After making
several payments, Antico, with her consent, set her up in a business
expediting permits and licenses for other businesses so that he did not
have to continue paying child support.217 To support her business
Antico referred clients to her, and then he would complete all of the
paperwork in her name.218 Antico’s co-workers knew about the
arrangement, but his supervisors did not.219 The court stated that the
fact that Antico’s co-workers knew about the arrangement “does not
vindicate his failure to disclose” the relationship to his supervisors.220
Two complications arise in comparing Thompson and Antico.
First, Antico was required to comply with disclosure laws.221 It is not
as clear, as stated above, that Thompson was under a similar
requirement. Second, assuming there was a conflict, disclosing it to
211

United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 264 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing to United
States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987)).
212
See id. at 264-65.
213
Id. at 249.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 253.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 253-54.
219
Id. at 265.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 263.
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her supervisor may not have solved the problem because he may have
wanted to reward one of the governor’s political supporters.222 But
Thompson did disclose her “political” concerns to the other members
of the evaluation committee.223 Although the committee members may
be more like the co-workers in Antico, the disclosure in Thompson
seems address the Third Circuit’s concern in Antico that nondisclosure evinces an “intent to deceive.”224
In Thompson, each of the committee members scored the
proposals on the same criteria, and there is no evidence to suggest that
any one member could overrule another.225 Otherwise, there would
have been no reason for Thompson to attempt to negotiate with the
other members of the evaluation committee to get them to change their
scores.226 The only reason that Adelman was awarded the contract was
because when the contract was put out for re-bid, as permitted by state
law, they lowered their score and a tie with Omega ensued.227 If
Aldeman did not lower their score, thus allowing Thompson to award
them the contract based on the state law tie-breaking procedure that
allowed other factors to be considered, it is almost certain that Omega
would have been awarded the contract regardless of Thompson’s
actions.228 In contrast, Antico had the discretionary power to approve
permits and licenses without requiring someone else’s approval or
knowledge.229 And he used the power to benefit himself so that he
would not have to pay child support.230
The policy behind disclosure is that the public should be assured
that elected officials and public employees are making decisions in the

222

See Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 878-79.
224
Antico, 275 F.3d at 265.
225
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 878-79.
226
See id. at 879.
227
Id.
228
See id.
229
Antico, 275 F.3d at 249.
230
Id. at 263.
223
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best interest of the public, and not in their own self-interest.231
Because Thompson’s disclosed her “political” concerns to the
evaluation committee, her actions seem to comply with this policy
concern. Therefore, based upon the above considerations, it appears
likely that if Thompson had been convicted of honest services fraud in
the Third Circuit, that court too would have reversed her conviction
because her disclosure to the evaluation committee seems to negate
their concern that she had an intent to deceive. Because it appears that
the Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit would come to the same
conclusion under the Thompson facts, the next question is whether the
facts of Panarella would lead to the same results if they had arisen in
the Seventh Circuit.
B. Applying the Seventh Circuit’s Test to the Facts of Panarella
In Panarella, a business owner (Panarella) hired a State Senator
(Loeper) as a consultant.232 Loeper failed to disclose his $330,000 in
income from this arrangement, as required under Pennsylvania law,
and both Panarella and the Loeper took actions to conceal the
relationship from the press.233 Panarella pled guilty to the charge that
he engaged in a scheme to deprive the public of the Loeper’s honest
services.234 But, on appeal, he argued that Loeper’s actions did not
amount to honest services fraud because there was no evidence that he
either bought, or that their arrangement influenced, Loeper’s vote on a
bill that if enacted would have been detrimental to Panarella’s
business.235
If Panarella had arisen in the Seventh Circuit, it is very likely that
the court would have found that Loeper misused his office for private

231

United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 697 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing to the
purpose behind Pennsylvania’s Public Official and Employee Ethics Act).
232
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681.
233
Id.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 690-91.
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gain and upheld Panarella’s conviction, as the Third Circuit did.236 The
facts of Panararella are very similar to the facts of Isaacs, where the
Seventh Circuit upheld former Illinois governor Otto Kerner’s
conviction for honest services fraud.237 In Isaacs, Kerner engaged in a
complicated scheme involving stock transactions that netted him a
profit of over $150,000 in exchange for helping various racing
interests.238 Kerner claimed he did not commit honest services fraud
because the state did not lose any money.239 The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, and upheld the conviction, finding that “[t]here was
evidence [that both] the State of Illinois and its citizens were deprived
of the loyal and honest services of their governor, [and] that the
defendants actually did exert special influence in favor of and
bestowed preferential treatment on [certain racing interests].”240
Like Kerner, Panarella engaged in a scheme to use the power of
government to benefit his private interests.241 The only difference
between the two defendants is that they were on different sides of the
transaction. Kerner was a public official who purchased and sold stock
in a corporation, and used his position and the power of government to
benefit that corporation.242 Panarella was a business owner, who hired
Loeper, the State Senate Majority Leader, to promote his business
interests.243 Loeper promoted Panarella’s business interests by
attending meetings between Panarella and state and local officials. 244
Additionally, Loeper furthered Panarella’s business interests by voting
against and helping to defeat legislation that would have had a

236

Id. at 680-81.
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1152 (7th Cir. 1974).
238
Id. at 1139.
239
Id. at 1149. Not only did the state not lose any money, but in fact its racing
revenues doubled as a result of Kerner’s actions. Id. at 1139.
240
Id. at 1150.
241
Id. at 1131-40; Panarella, 277 F.3d at 680-82.
242
Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1135-39.
243
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681.
244
Id.
237
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substantial negative impact on the business.245 Finally, like Kerner,
Panarella and Loeper took clandestine steps— that included making
the payments through a third party—to hide the arrangement from the
public.246
Isaacs, however, was decided before McNally; therefore, one
must examine post-McNally law to ensure an accurate comparison. As
previously stated, the Seventh Circuit determined in Bloom that the
misuse of office for private gain is its standard for delineating criminal
from non-criminal behavior.247 In discussing the “misuse of office” in
Bloom, the Seventh Circuit stated, “[i]n almost all of the intangible
rights cases this circuit has decided (before McNally or since § 1346),
the defendant used his office for private gain, as by accepting a bribe
in exchange for official action.”248 The court cited to Isaacs in support
of this proposition.249
In Thompson, the Seventh Circuit noted that “the history of
honest-services prosecutions is one in which the ‘private gain’ comes
from third parties who suborn the employee with side payments, often
derived via kickbacks skimmed from a public contract.”250 The facts
of Panarella do not suggest that the $330,000 in “consulting fees” that
Panarella paid to Loeper were part of a kickback scheme.251
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit would likely have found that
Panarella’s payments to Loeper were bribes. First the payments were
made to Loeper through a third party,252 and this seems very similar to
the stock payment scheme that the court found to be a bribe in

245

Id.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1152 (noting that the scheme depended upon “continued
concealment” and “devious and complicated [financial] devices”); Panarella, 277
F.3d at 681.
247
United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998).
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007)
251
277 F.3d 678, 681 (3d Cir. 2002).
252
Id.
246
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Isaacs.253 Second, as a result of the payments, Loeper took actions as a
public official to benefit his private interests.254 Thus, Panarella
involves a situation where a public official received a private gain
from a third party and in exchange for taking action in his official
capacity, and thereby satisfying the Bloom standard. Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit, like the Third Circuit, would likely uphold Panarella’s
conviction for engaging in a scheme to deprive the public of Loeper’s
honest services.
C. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s and the Third Circuit’s Differing
Standards for Honest Services Fraud
The above analyses have shown that, at least under the limited
facts of Thompson and Panarella, both the Seventh Circuit’s “misuse
of office for private gain” standard and the Third Circuit’s “state law”
standard likely lead to the same outcomes. Because Thompson lies at
the other edges of the honest services doctrine, this suggests that in
most cases neither of the tests is better in practice than the other. This,
of course, assumes that the courts reached the right outcomes in both
cases. One possible conclusion is that the courts have generally gotten
the right answer despite applying different standards.255 But, if neither
of the tests is better in practice, the next question is whether one of the
tests is better in theory.
The answer to that question appears to be no. Both courts agree
with the theory that public officials owe fiduciary duties to the
citizenry.256 What they appear to disagree on, however, is the
semantics of how to define the fiduciary duties that are owed to the
public, and what other elements are necessary, if any, to limit the reach
of § 1346 and to prevent minor infractions from becoming major
federal crimes.257 The Third Circuit believes that limiting fiduciary
253

See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144-46 (7th Cir. 1974).
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 681.
255
Tendler, supra note 2, at 2765.
256
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692; Bloom, 149 F.3d 654-55.
257
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93; Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654-55.
254
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duties to those that arise under state law is the best way to resolve
vagueness and federalism concerns.258 The vagueness concern is
abated because the defendants have knowledge that their actions are
illegal.259 The federalism concerns are lessened because the state has
spoken on what actions it considers illegal.260
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit does not limit fiduciary
duties only to those that arise under state law, but leaves open the
possibility of reaching that conclusion in the future.261 But because the
Seventh Circuit does not limit the fiduciary duties to those created by
state law, and therefore allows for the breach of more fiduciary duties,
it needs a way to prevent the breach of every fiduciary duty from
becoming a federal crime. The Seventh Circuit does this by adding the
private gain requirement.262 Furthermore, Thompson indicates that the
private gain must come from a third party.263
Although different, both courts’ standards are grounded in sound
principles of statutory interpretation. The Seventh Circuit concluded
by passing § 1346 Congress intended only to criminalize conduct that
would have been criminal prior to McNally.264 To determine what was
criminal prior to McNally, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court’s description of the honest services fraud doctrine that in
McNally.265 The Seventh Circuit then reasoned that this description of
the honest services fraud doctrine is what Congress resurrected in
passing § 1346.266 Conversely, the Third Circuit has relied more on
258

Panarella, 277 F.3d at 692-93.
Id. at 698.
260
Id. at 694.
261
See United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 1999).
262
Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655. Under this reading of the Bloom standard the
“misuse of office” element is the breach of the fiduciary duty.
263
United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007).
264
Bloom, 149 F.3d at 655.
265
Id. (“[i]n McNally the Supreme Court described the intangible rights theory
this way: ‘a public official owes a fiduciary duty to the public, and misuse of his
office for private gain is a fraud’”) (citing to McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 355 (1987).
266
Id.
259
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criminal and political theory to determine that state law is the better
line for determining what conduct amounts to honest services fraud.267
Because both standards have sound theoretical bases, and appear to
lead to same outcomes under the same set of facts, it is difficult to
conclude that either standard is better in theory.
One simple solution to the problem raised by Thompson,268 is for
the Seventh Circuit to simply adopt the Third Circuit’s state law
limiting principal. This solution has the benefit of preventing the
problem raised by Thompson because a different standard not
involving private gain is used. But this recommendation is inadequate
as a long-term solution to general problems raised by the honest
services doctrine because the state law limiting principle raises its own
set of problems, although separate and distinct from the problems
raised by the misuse of office for private gain limiting principle. For
example, the Third Circuit struggles with determining which state laws
create fiduciary duties and which laws do not, and under what
circumstances those duties arise and under what circumstances they do
not arise.269 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit wrestles with
defining what constitutes a “misuse of office” and a “private gain.”270
Ultimately, these are issues that the Supreme Court will face if it
grants certiorari to an honest services fraud case.
In the meantime, because neither circuit is likely to adopt another
standard, it is beneficial to determine the potential effect of Thompson
on honest services fraud law in the Seventh Circuit. In Thompson, the
court held “that neither an increase in salary for doing what one’s
superiors deem a good job, nor an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a
267

United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 692-98 (3d Cir. 2002).
See infra Section IV.
269
See supra note 187.
270
United States v. Rezko, No. 05 CR 691, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73517, at
*13-15 (Oct. 2, 2007) (the defendant does not have to personally gain, instead the
only requirement is that any participant in the scheme realizes a private gain); United
States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826, 835 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming Thompson’s refinement
of Bloom, but finding the instant case to vary in both degree and kind from
Thompson; here a $30 million fraud that the defendant intentionally participated in
versus $1,000 pay raise where the defendant “did not act out of private gain”).
268
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‘private benefit’ for the purpose of § 1346.” In the abstract this seems
like a logical holding. But this holding has the potential to open a
loophole that will perpetuate the graft and corruption that Congress
intended to prevent when it reinstated the honest services fraud
doctrine through the enactment of § 1346.
IV. PRIVATE GAIN IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
A. Northern District of Illinois Decides that Current or Future Jobs
can be a Private Gain
Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thompson, on three
occasions, courts in the Northern District of Illinois held that one’s job
or the potential of future employment can be a private gain under the
Bloom standard.271 The first case, United States v. Bauer,272 was one of
the first cases to arise out of the Illinois licenses-for-bribes scandal273
that would ultimately lead to the conviction of former governor
George Ryan for honest services fraud.274 Dean Bauer served as the
Inspector General in the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office.275 As
Inspector General, one of his duties was to investigate instances of
employee misconduct.276 Bauer was indicted for honest services fraud
for failing to investigate, and for his conduct in burying, allegations
that various licensing facilities were accepting bribes in exchange for
driver’s licenses.277 The court accepted the government’s argument
271

United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829-30 (N.D. Ill. 2006);
United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *3
(N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004); United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16784, at *9-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000).
272
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000).
273
For a partial list of the key dates in the licenses for bribes scandal see
License Scandal Chronology, ST. J.-REG., Apr. 26, 2002, at 3.
274
United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 697-99 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding
Governor Ryan’s convictions).
275
Bauer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1.
276
Id. at *3.
277
Id. at *9-13.
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that Bauer stood to gain because his actions provided a “political
advantage” to his political patron.278 Thus, he stood to, and did gain,
when George Ryan was elected Governor.279
The second case, United States v. Munson, occurred in the private
sector. Michael Munson, an attorney, was indicted for honest services
fraud because of a scheme he allegedly engaged in with executives of
Nicor Energy in order to manipulate certain financial information.280
Munson claimed that he could not be charged with honest services
fraud because he did not personally gain, or receive any direct
monetary compensation, such as a bribe or kickback.281 The
government argued that Munson’s personal gains were the legal fees
he received, and his hope that by currying favor with the executives he
would receive future independent legal work from Nicor or become its
general counsel.282 The court summarized Bauer’s holding as “acts
intended to curry political favor in hopes of increasing the defendant’s
current job security or of leading to future promotions [are] sufficient
personal gain to satisfy § 1346,” and accepted the government’s
argument.283
The third case, United States v. Sorich, arose out of the City of
Chicago’s patronage scandal.284 Robert Sorich, Assistant to the
Director of the City’s Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, was
indicted for honest services fraud for ensuring that city jobs went to
certain political supporters.285 Sorich argued that charges could not be
sustained because the prosecution did not allege that the City of
278

Id. at *11-12.
Id. After George Ryan was elected Governor, Bauer was promoted to a
position in the Illinois Department of Transportation. Id. at *4. A few months later
he resigned after having qualified for a state pension. Id.
280
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004).
281
Id. at *2.
282
Id.
283
Id. at *3.
284
United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-24 (N.D. Ill. 2006). See
also Rudolph Bush & Dan Mihalopoulos, Daley Jobs Chief Guilty, CHI. TRIB., July
7, 2006, at 1.
285
Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 823.
279

127
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/5

42

Lapointe: Missing the Forest for the Trees: The Seventh Circuit’s Refinemen

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

Chicago or its residents suffered a loss, or that he personally gained.286
The court found that Sorich “[was] well aware of the gains to be had
from [his] machinations” and, citing to both Bauer and Munson,
allowed the prosecution to go forward.287 Additionally, the court found
that although “subsequent career security or advancement” is not as
easy to quantify as a bribery or kickback scheme, it nevertheless could
serve as a private gain for honest services fraud.288
In Thompson, the government cited to Sorich and Munson for the
proposition that Thompson’s increased salary was a private gain for
honest services fraud.289 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding
neither case persuasive.290 But the court did not explain its reason for
this finding.291 The simple explanation could be that the Northern
District of Illinois’ holdings in Sorich, Munson and, by extension,
Bauer are overruled.292 But if those holdings are not overruled—and
the court’s statement that Sorich and Munson are “unpersuasive”293
suggest that they are not—then the Seventh Circuit may have
inadvertently opened a loophole that will allow subtle corruption
schemes to go unpunished.
B. Distinguishing Thompson
One way to distinguish Thompson from Sorich and Bauer, but not
from Munson, is based on the jobs that each defendant held.
Thompson held a civil servant job, while both Sorich and Bauer held

286

Id. at 828.
Id. at 829.
288
Id. at 830.
289
United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007).
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Some experts believe that this ruling may lead to the reversal of Sorich’s
conviction. See Ward, supra note 33, at 20.
293
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884.
287
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politically-appointed positions.294 As a civil servant, Thompson had
independent job security.295 On the other hand, Sorich’s and Bauer’s
job security rested on their political patrons remaining in power.296 If
Thompson is distinguishable from Sorich and Bauer for this reason,
then the Seventh Circuit may have created an opening for “subtle
schemes” that now cannot be punished as honest services fraud.
One such scheme is where civil servants engage on their own, and
without any pressure from their political supervisors, in conduct such
as awarding contracts to or perhaps hiring the friends and supporters
of their current political patrons. The political appointees then notice
that their friends and supporters are benefiting, and as a result reward
the civil servants with extra or higher bonuses through “normal
personnel practices.”297 Under Thompson, this would not be a private
gain because the court stated that “getting a raise through normal
personnel practices does not sound like an aspect of a ‘scheme or
artifice.’”298 Yet, these “sublte schemes”—where the civil servants are
receiving a private gain in the form of salary increase that they would
otherwise not have received—would propagate the corruption and
graft that § 1346 was enacted to counter.299 One limitation to this
scenario is that the civil servants could not be substantially
compensated because their raises or bonuses would have to be given
through normal personnel practices. But what is considered normal
may vary widely, and this added condition would certainly create
another obstacle for the government to consider in determining
whether to prosecute, and ultimately for it to prove at trial.
In addition to civil servants acting on their own, another
possibility is that the political appointees may create a “wink and nod”
294

Id. at 882; Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; United States v. Bauer, No.
00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2000).
295
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 882.
296
Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 829-30; Bauer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at
*11-12.
297
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884.
298
Id.
299
Id.
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work environment, or apply subtle pressure so that the civil servants
know what to do and are compensated for the effort. Regardless of
whether subtle pressure is applied or whether the civil servants create
the system on their own, the end result is the same—the continuation
of public corruption that can no longer be punished as honest services
fraud.
The above scenario rests on the assumption that Thompson did not
overrule Sorich and Bauer. But again, the simplest explanation may be
that Thompson did overrule those cases. Because Munson cannot be
readily distinguished from Thompson, this argument may have more
weight. The only apparent distinction between Thompson and Munson
is that Munson occurred in the private sector where Thompson
occurred in the public sector. Other than a public/private distinction,
there does not appear to be much difference between the cases. Both
defendants received a small financial benefit, but it was not the result
of a bribe or a kickback.300 Thompson received a $1,000 increase to
her salary.301 While Munson received the legal fees for working on
various documents, and had hope of becoming Nicor’s General
Counsel.302
In other circuits, the public/private distinction may matter because
it is more difficult prove private honest services fraud than it is to
prove public honest services fraud because the fiduciary duties are
different.303 But the Seventh Circuit appears to treat public and private
honest services fraud in the same manner by subjecting both to the
Bloom standard.304 If, however, in the Seventh Circuit, the
public/private distinction does matter, then Thompson almost certainly
300

Id. at 879; United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14274, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004).
301
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879.
302
Munson, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14274 at *2.
303
United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996).
304
See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 697-98 (7th Cir. 2007)
(public); United States v. Segal, 495 F.3d 826, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2007) (private);
United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2003) (private); United
States v. Rezko, No. 05 CR 691, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73517, at *10-16 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 2, 2007) (private).
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overrules the Northern District cases because otherwise it would turn
honest services fraud law on its head. It is simply illogical to say that
Thompson’s raise was not a private gain, but that Bauer’s law fees and
hope for new employment was a gain.
But because the Seventh Circuit in Thompson only found Sorich
and Munson unpersuasive, and did not explain its reasoning or state
that prior law was overruled, the public/private distinction remains an
open issue, as does the public servant/political appointee distinction.305
One solution that may have avoided the “subtle scheme” problem,
reached the same outcome as the Seventh Circuit did in Thompson,
and distinguished Sorich, Muson, and Bauer, would have been to
decide as a threshold matter whether Thompson engaged in a
“scheme.”
V. DETERMINING IF THERE IS A “SCHEME” AS A THRESHOLD MATTER
A. Scheme Defined as an Artful Plot or Plan to Deceive Others
The mail fraud statute states in pertinent part that:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, . . . for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so
to do, places in any post office . . . any matter . . . to
be sent or delivered by the Postal Service . . . shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned.306
The United States Code, however, does not define the terms “scheme”
or “artifice.” But, the terms may generally be understood to mean
“[a]n artful plot or plan, [usually] to deceive others.”307
Taking the terms under their common meanings, the Seventh
Circuit may have avoided the questions raised after Thompson if the
305

Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (emphasis added).
307
See supra note 49.
306
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court had decided as a threshold matter whether Thompson had
engaged in a “scheme.” If Thompson did not engage in a scheme than
the other issues are moot—there would be no need to determine
whether she had misused her office or had a private gain because there
would be no fraud. Under this analysis, “scheme” becomes a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition. If a scheme is not found, then
the analysis can stop. Conversly, if a scheme is found the court must
continue the analysis to determine if the purpose of the scheme was to
defraud another. The analysis could also be applied in the Third
Circuit because if there is no scheme, then there is no need to
determine whether any fiduciary duties have been breached.
In Thompson, the prosecution did not argue that there was any
malfeasance regarding the political contributions made by the owner
of Adelman, or that there was any form of a kickback scheme.308
Neither did the prosecution allege that Thompson had knowledge of,
or allowed the contributions to enter into her decision making
process.309 To explain the “political” considerations that Thompson
referred to, the court assumed that Thompson knew that her boss, a
political appointee, preferred Adelman Travel.310
The court next speculated that Thompon’s boss might have had
three political reasons for wanting to award the contract to
Adelman.311 The first reason was that he might have wanted to reward
one of the governor’s supporters.312 The court stated that if this was
the reason it would be problematic.313 The second reason was that he
may have wanted to gain politically by driving down the cost of
government, and thus helping his boss—the incumbent governor.314
This could be accomplished by selecting Adelman because it bid the

308

See supra note 26.
Id.
310
Id.
311
Id. at 879-80.
312
Id. at 879.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 879-80.
309
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lowest price.315 The court stated that this may be good politics and was
not a crime.316 The final political reason might have been to select a
local firm over an out-of-state firm.317 The court stated that this too
may have been good politics and did not violate federal law.318 Finally,
the court stated that under the evidence presented no jury could find
beyond a reasonable doubt which of the three political reasons was
relied on in awarding the contract to Adelman.319 Moreover, the court
concluded that Thompson and her boss may not have shared the same
political reason.320 Furthermore, the court stated that Thompson may
have selected Aldelman solely to please her boss, regardless of his
reasons for wanting to select Adelman.321
The Seventh Circuit based its opinion upon on the assumption that
Thompson was just trying to please her boss. This is evinced by the
court’s holding “that neither an increase in salary for doing what one’s
superiors deem a good job, nor an addition to one’s peace of mind, is a
‘private benefit’ for the purpose of § 1346.”322 Based on this holding,
it seems clear that the Seventh Circuit would have found that
Thompson did not engage in a “scheme” because her actions do not
evince any conduct that demonstrates that she devised or participated
in a plan to deceive another.
On the other hand, the facts of Bauer, Munson, and Sorich show
that each of those defendants did engage in a “scheme.” Bauer took
steps to bury investigations into the Secretary of State’s office in order
to spare the office from embarrassment.323 Hiding information from
investigators certainly fits the definition of a plan to deceive others.
315

Id. at 878.
Id. at 880.
317
Id.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
321
Id.
322
Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
323
United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at *8
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000).
316
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Munson allegedly assisted three Nicor executives in inflating the
company’s earnings in violation of generally-accepted accounting
principles.324 Munson assisted the endeavor through the manipulation
of legal documents.325 These actions also fit the definition of engaging
in a plan to deceive others. Finally, Sorich allegedly participated in the
rigging of non-policy-making city jobs.326 His actions included
ordering others to conceal the names of job candidates submitted to his
office and the meetings regarding this process, creating a “sham”
process for hiring and promotion, and creating a “color-coded”
tracking system “to [ensure] that each group jostling for favors
remained both relatively satisfied and indebted.”327 Sorich’s actions
also demonstrate a plan to deceive others.
The above analysis suggests Thompson can be distinguished from
Bauer, Munson, and Sorich on the ground that Thompson did not, but
that Bauer, Munson and Sorich did, participate in a scheme. Thus, if
the Seventh Circuit had made this threshold determination it could
have avoided the potential problem that arises after Thompson. As
previously stated, this problem is the Machiavellian or “subtle
scheme” engaged in by civil servants to award the friends and
supporters of their current political supervisors, and to be rewarded for
their efforts through normal compensation procedures.328 If the civil
servant/political appointee dichotomy is the distinction between the
Thompson case and the lower court cases, then after Thompson the
government will be unable to prosecute these schemes as honest
services fraud.
A potential weakness of the proposed solution is that in Thompson
the government’s position was very similar to the above noted “subtle
scheme.” In Thompson, however, the government took the argument
one step further by reasoning that Thompson’s objectives were
324

United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004).
325
Id. at *1-2.
326
United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 2006).
327
Id. at 824, 825, 829.
328
See supra Section IV(B).

134
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007

49

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 1

Fall 2007

irrelevant. 329 The government claimed that the only issue that
mattered was that she did not follow the administrative rules exactly as
they were laid down.330 Therefore, if the courts are going to make a
threshold determination that a defendant engaged in a “scheme,” they
will need a method to determine whether the plan is “artful” or
“deceptive.” Adopting a business judgment rule for public employees
may be one solution to this problem.
B. A Business Judgment Rule for Civil Servants
The business judgment rule is frequently used as a defense in
corporate law.331 Under a typical formulation of the rule, “[corporate]
directors will not be held liable for honest mistakes of judgment if they
acted with due care, in good faith, without a disabling conflict, and in
furtherance of a rational business purpose.”332 If the courts applied the
business judgment rule, or a modified version of it, to decisions of
public employees it would help them to delineate between actions that
are good for the government and “schemes.” One benefit of this
solution is that there currently exists a substantial body of law in this
area in the corporate context. A second, and perhaps more important,
benefit is that it may prove extremely helpful in cases such as
Thompson and Bauer where only one person acted, especially since
the Supreme Court has long held that one person schemes exist.333
Applying the business judgment rule to the facts of Thompson
probably leads to the conclusion that she acted within its scope. First,
she did not have any disabling conflicts.334 Second, the fact that she
disclosed her “political” considerations to the evaluation committee
329

United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
331
E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of
Directors' Business Decisions—An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy
and Counselling Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 1247, 1249 (1982).
332
Id.
333
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954).
334
Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879.
330
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suggests that she acted with due care and in good faith.335 Third, if we
accept the court’s hypothesized political motivation of trying to save
the state money, then that motivation would meet the rational business
purpose element.336 Finally, in discussing the bribery count, the court
seems to adopt a quasi business judgment rule with the following
statement:
Public employees often implement rules with which
they disagree, and they are tempted to bend these rules
to achieve what they deem better outcomes. As long as
the state gets what it contracts for, at the market price,
no funds have been misapplied, even if the state's rules
should have led it to buy something more expensive
(and perhaps of higher quality too). 337
Of course, it is always possible that Thompson did not act in good
faith and was trying to steer the contract to Adelman in the hopes of
receiving a bonus for pleasing her boss. But because there currently is
no business judgment rule as a defense to honest services mail fraud,
the court did not have access to any evidence on the issue. Ultimately,
based on the court’s finding that Thompsons was innocent, it is very
likely that Thompson would have come within the scope of a business
judgment rule, but this determination cannot be made with certainty.
Applying the business judgment rule to facts of Bauer leads to the
conclusion that Bauer’s actions fall outside of its scope. First, he did
have a disabling conflict in that he was trying to protect his political
patron from embarrassing information.338 Second, by burying
investigations into the embarrassing information, Bauer acted with bad
faith and without regard for the public’s interest in knowing what is

335

See id.
Id. at 879-80.
337
Id. at 881-82.
338
See United States v. Bauer, No. 00 CR 81, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16784, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2000).
336
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occurring in state agencies.339 Thus, his actions would not be protected
under the business judgment rule.
In cases where multiple parties are involved, such as Sorich and
Munson, it is probably less necessary to resort to the business
judgment rule because it is more likely that there will be extrinsic
evidence of a scheme. Because others are involved there is more likely
to be other evidence such as communication records, and there is
always the possibility of flipping one of the defendants to testify
against the others. But, if the business judgment rule were applied to
those cases, Sorich’s and Munson’s actions would be unprotected by
the rule. Munson engaged in conduct with three Nicor executives to
manipulate the corporation’s financial information.340 Likewise, Sorich
took great pains to develop and conceal an elaborate scheme, with at
least two other individuals, to create a “sham” hiring and promotion
process.341 Neither action is consistent with concepts of good faith or
acting in the best interests of one’s employer or the public.
The above analysis has shown that by adopting a business
judgment rule for public employees the courts could more readily
determine whether a public employee’s actions were taken in
furtherance of the government’s interest, or whether they instead
amounted to an artful plot or plan meant to deceive—in other words, a
scheme. Furthermore, this type of analysis has been shown to be
helpful in the case of a single civil servant’s actions where extrinsic
evidence may be lacking.
CONCLUSION
The mail fraud statute has long been used in the government’s
fight against public corruption, and is one of its most powerful
weapons.342 Through the enactment of § 1346, Congress approved of
339

Id.
United States v. Munson, No. 03 CR 1153-4, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14274, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2004).
341
United States v. Sorich, 427 F. Supp. 2d 820, 823-25 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
342
See supra note 2.
340
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the honest services fraud theory whereby public officials owe
fiduciary duties to the public.343 But because of the broad language in
§ 1346, courts have adopted limiting principles to cabin the reach of
the statute and to counter concerns about vagueness, federalism and
prosecutorial overreaching.344
The Seventh Circuit and the Third Circuit have adopted separate
limiting principles. The Seventh Circuit uses the “misuse of office for
private gain” standard,345 while the Third Circuit uses the “state law
fiduciary duty” standard.346 Despite the differences, this Note has
shown that both standards are likely to lead to the same outcomes
under the same set of facts. Because of this result, neither standard can
be found to be better in theory or in practice. At most it appears that
each circuit will grapple with separate issues. The Third Circuit will
struggle with determining which state laws create fiduciary duties, and
the Seventh Circuit will wrangle with determining what constitutes a
“misuse of office” and a “private gain.”
In Thompson, the Seventh Circuit determined that raises given in
the normal course of business and psychic benefits are not private
gains.347 Previously, however, the Northern District of Illinois had, on
three separate occasions, held that one’s job or the possibility of a
future job can serve as a private gain.348 It is possible that the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Thompson simply overrules the Northern District
cases. But because the Seventh Circuit only found these cases
unpersuasive and did not explicitly overrule them, it is arguable that
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they are distinguishable and remain good law.349 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Thompson has the potential to create an
unintended “subtle scheme” problem whereby civil servants can take
actions that benefit the friends and supporters of their current politicalappointee supervisors without the threat of punishment. This result has
the potential of hampering the very purpose behind the enactment of §
1346.
This Note has argued that this outcome could have been avoided
had the Seventh Circuit made a threshold determination of whether a
“scheme,” defined by its ordinary usage, existed. This Note further
concluded that this determination may not entirely rectify the “subtle
scheme” problem, especially in the case of a single civil servant. But,
this Note has shown that this problem can be addressed through the
adoption of a business judgment rule for public employees.
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See Thompson, 484 F.3d at 884.
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